Jurisdiction and Applicable Law Under UNCLOS by Tzeng, Peter
COMMENT
Jurisdiction and Applicable Law Under UNCLOS
INTRODUCTION
In the recent case of Chagos Marine Protected Area,' a five-member tribunal
constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS) 2 held in its hands the fate of the Chagos Archipelago. One of the ques-
tions before the tribunal was whether it had the jurisdiction to declare that the
British occupation of the Chagos Archipelago and the forcible removal of the
Archipelago's indigenous population violated the fundamental right to self-
determination. The answer hinged on a technical, procedural point: Does the
applicable law provision of UNCLOS, Article 293(1), expand the jurisdiction of
UNCLOS tribunals ?3
The law was not on the side of the Chagossians. It is a well-established
principle of international law that applicable law provisions do not expand the
jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals.' So after Mauritius impliedly
1. Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA Case Repository No. 2011-03,
Award of Mar. 18, 2015, ¶ 181 [hereinafter Chagos Marine Protected Area, Award], http://
www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/MU-UK%2o2ol5o318%2oAward.pdf [http://perma.cc/EMQ9-
PQHS].
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. io, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [herein-
after UNCLOS].
3. For the purposes of this Comment, an "UNCLOS tribunal" is any court or tribunal that ex-
ercises jurisdiction by virtue of UNCLOS. See id. art. 287(1); infra text accompanying note
23.
4. See Channel Tunnel Grp. Ltd. v. Sec'y of State for Transp. of the Gov't of the U.K., Partial
Award of Jan. 30, 2007, 132 I.L.R. 1, ¶¶ 152-53; Access to Info. Under Article 9 of the OSPAR
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.), PCA Case Repository, Final Award of July 2, 2003, 23 R.I.A.A. 59,
¶ 85; ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 123 1-3 (2014); Christoph Schreuer, jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 1 McGILLJ. DisP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2014).
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asserted that Article 293(1) could expand the jurisdiction of the tribunal,' the
United Kingdom-the other party to the dispute-quicldy refuted the asser-
tion, noting that "[t]his is an old debate, and one that, quite franldy, we should
not be having."6 The tribunal ultimately ruled in favor of the United Kingdom
on this point. But if the principle is so well-established and the debate so old,
why did it receive so much attention in the written and oral stages of the pro-
ceedings?
The reason is straightforward but possibly appalling to international law-
yers: UNCLOS tribunals have not uniformly conformed to the principle. As of
September 2016, UNCLOS tribunals in seven cases have considered whether
Article 293(1) can expand their jurisdiction. On the one hand, the tribunals in
M/V Saiga (No. 2),' Guyana v. Suriname,' and M/V Virginia G9 (the M/V Sai-
ga line of cases) effectively invoked Article 293(1) to expand their jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the tribunals in MOX Plant,10 Chagos," Arctic Sunrise,12 and
5. It should be noted that Mauritius on the surface argued that Article 293(1) does not expand
the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals. Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.),
PCA Case Repository No. 2011-03, Hearing on Jurisdiction and the Merits, Day 4, at 441,
lines 1-2 [hereinafter Chagos Marine Protected Area, Hearing Day 4], http://
www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1574 [http://perma.cc/9HH3-XVIX]. Nevertheless,
throughout the proceedings, Mauritius repeatedly invoked Article 293(1) to expand the ju-
risdiction of the tribunal. See Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA Case
Repository No. 2011-03, Hearing on Jurisdiction and the Merits, Day 6, at 655, lines 13-16
[hereinafter Chagos Marine Protected Area, Hearing Day 6], http://www.pcacases.com
/web/sendAttach/1576 [http://perma.cc/44MC-VMSV]; Chagos Marine Protected Area,
Hearing Day 4, supra, at p. 440, lines 8-23; Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v.
U.K.), PCA Case Repository No. 2011-03, Memorial of the Republic of Mauritius of Aug. 1,
2012, ¶ 5.33 [hereinafter Chagos Marine Protected Area, Memorial of Mauritius], http://
www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1796 [http://perma.cc/LPL-1K326].
6. ChagosMarineProtectedArea, Hearing Day 6, supra note 5, atp. 655, lines 18-19.
7. M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), ITLOS Case No. 2, Judgment of July 1, 1999, ¶
155 [hereinafter M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment], http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos
/documents/cases/case-no_2/merits/Judgment.0107-99.E.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PAQ
-2UPA].
8. Guyana v. Suriname, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal of Sept. 17, 2007, 47 I.L.M. 166, ¶ 413
[hereinafter Guyana v. Suriname, Award].
9. M/V Virginia G (Pan. v. Guinea-Bissau), ITLOS Case No. 19, Judgment of Apr. 14,
2014, ¶ 359 [hereinafter M/V Virginia G, Judgment], http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin
/idos/documents/cases/case-no.19/judgment/C19-Judgment_14.o4-14_corr2.pdf [http://
perma.cc/W2NZ-LJPH].
10. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), PCA Case Repository No. 2002-01, Procedural Order No. 3 of June
24, 2003, ¶ 19 [hereinafter MOXPlant, Procedural Order No. 3], http://www.pcacases.com
/web/sendAttach/867 [http://perma.cc/XDP8-3RWQ].
n1. Chagos Marine Protected Area, Award, supra note 1, ¶ 181.
243
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Duzgit Integrity13 (the MOXPlant line of cases) stood by the principle, rejecting
any expansion of jurisdiction under Article 293(1).14 Other UNCLOS tribunals
have simply not addressed the question.
Despite this inconsistency in jurisprudence, the question of jurisdiction
under Article 293(1) has received little attention among scholars. The eminent
treatises on the law of the sea bypass the question entirely.1 6 One commentator
raised the issue in the context of the M/V Saiga (No. 2) dispute," and another
briefly touched on the issue in the context of the MOX Plant case." But no
12. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), PCA Case Repository No. 2014-02, Award on the Merits
of Aug. 14, 2015, ¶ 188 [hereinafter Arctic Sunrise, Award on the Merits], http://
www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1438 [http://perma.cc/A9PX-E2VR].
13. Duzgit Integrity (Malta v. Sio Tom6 & Principe), PCA Case Repository No. 2014-07, Award
of Sept. 5, 2016, ¶¶ 207-08 [hereinafter Duzgit Integrity, Award], http://pcacases.com/web
/sendAttach/1915 [http://perma.cc/QA7Z-XFM3].
14. In addition, Judges Wolfrum and Cot emphasized in a joint separate opinion to ITLOS's
order on provisional measures in ARA Libertad that jurisdiction under Article 288(1)
and applicable law under Article 293(1) "have to be separated clearly." ARA Libertad
(Arg. v. Ghana), ITLOS Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, Joint Separate Opinion
of Judge Wolfrum & Judge Cot, ¶ 7, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents
/cases/case-no.20/C20_Ord 15.12.2012 SepOp Wolfrum-Cot orig-no-gutter.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6GV3-9C2L].
is. In the recent case of Philippines v. China, the Philippines claimed in its memorial that
China had breached the Convention on Biological Diversity. Phil. v. China,
PCA Case Repository No. 2013-19, Memorial of the Philippines of Mar. 30, 2014, Vol.
1, ¶ 6.89, http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/Memorial%200f%2othe%2oPhilippines%20
Volume%2oI.pdf [http://perma.cc/A4VG-LQSR]. Had the Philippines asserted this claim
as a formal submission, it probably would have prompted the tribunal to consider whether
Article 293(1) could expand its jurisdiction to adjudicate this claim. However, the Philip-
pines ultimately made clear that it was not making such a claim as a formal submission.
Phil. v. China, PCA Case Repository No. 2013-19, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility
of Oct. 29, 2015, ¶ 282 [hereinafter Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility],
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506 [http://perma.cc/DAA9-LKVQ].
16. See, e.g., A.O. ADEDE, THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF THE SEA (1987) (not discussing jurisdiction under Arti-
cle 293(1)); 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF THE SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY
72-74 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1989) (same); Bernard H. Oxman, Courts and Tribu-
nals: The ICJ, ITLOS, and Arbitral Tribunals, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA 394 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015) (same).
17. James Harrison, Safeguards Against Excessive Enforcement Measures in the Exclusive Economic
Zone-Law and Practice, in JURISDICTION OVER SHIPS 217, 228-29 (Henrik Rongbom ed.,
2015).
is. M. Bruce Volbeda, Comment, The MOX Plant Case: The Question of "Supplemental Jurisdic-
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scholar has ever analyzed multiple cases interpreting Article 293(1) in a single
text. Even the judgments and awards of UNCLOS tribunals do not dedicate
much discussion to the subject. This Comment aims not only to fill this gap in
the literature, but also to help inform pending and future UNCLOS disputes
implicating Article 293(1), including the high-profile case of Ukraine v. Russia.
This Comment is organized as follows. Part I provides background on
UNCLOS and explains why Article 293(1) does not expand the jurisdiction of
UNCLOS tribunals. Part II explains how the UNCLOS tribunals in the M/V
Saiga (No. 2) line of cases nonetheless exercised jurisdiction under Article
293(1). Part III then presents how the UNCLOS tribunals in the MOX Plant
line of cases rejected jurisdiction under Article 293(1) but failed to recognize the
legal error in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) line of cases. The Comment then con-
cludes by noting how the failure to recognize this error may ultimately under-
mine the UNCLOS dispute settlement regime.
I. UNCLOS AND ARTICLE 293(1)
A critical difference between domestic legal systems and the international
legal order is that the latter lacks courts with compulsory jurisdiction.9 One
who suffers an injury under domestic law will usually be able to seek relief in a
domestic court with jurisdiction over the claim, whereas one who suffers an in-
jury under international law often cannot find a judicial forum with jurisdic-
tion.
The drafters of UNCLOS sought to change this reality with respect to
claims concerning the law of the sea. Famously characterized as "a constitution
for the oceans,"20 the Convention sets out in 320 articles and nine annexes a
comprehensive body of law governing practically all matters relating to the law
of the sea, such as maritime delimitation, environmental protection, fisheries
management, and marine scientific research. Most importantly for the purpos-
es of this Comment, Part XV of the Convention establishes a dispute settlement
mechanism to ensure compliance with the Convention. Two provisions in Part
XV are particularly relevant.
19. PATRICK DAILLIER ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 959 (8th ed. 2009); STEPHEN C.
MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 2015); Chester Brown, Inher-
ent Powers in International Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AD-
JUDICATION 828, 834 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2013); Andreas Paulus, International
Adjudication, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 207, 208 (Samantha Besson &
John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
20. Tommy T.B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, in THE LAw OF THE SEA, xxxiii (U.N. Pub.
Sales No. E.83.V.5, 1983).
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First, the jurisdiction provision, Article 288(1), grants UNCLOS tribunals
the jurisdiction to settle UNCLOS claims.2 1 Consequently, aside from a few ex-
ceptions,2 any state that suffers an injury under UNCLOS may seek relief from
an UNCLOS tribunal. In theory, UNCLOS tribunals may take one of four
forms: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), an Annex VII tribunal, or an Annex VIII tribu-
nal.23 In practice, however, all UNCLOS tribunals have either been ITLOS or
an Annex VII tribunal. ITLOS is a permanent judicial body composed of twen-
ty-one judges.24 By contrast, Annex VII tribunals are ad hoc arbitral tribunals
normally composed of five arbitrators.2 5 Together, ITLOS and Annex VII tri-
bunals have been seized of twenty-one disputes (excluding prompt release cas-
es) and have reached a decision on the merits in ten of those disputes.2 6
Second, the Convention's applicable law provision, Article 293(1), provides
that UNCLOS tribunals "shall apply this Convention and other rules of interna-
tional law not incompatible with this Convention."27 Some have interpreted Article
293(1) to expand the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals to include certain non-
UNCLOS claims. Under this interpretation, Article 293(1) would grant UN-
CLOS tribunals the jurisdiction to declare whether states have violated certain
non-UNCLOS rules of international law, such as the rules on the use of force,
the rules on the acquisition of territory, and the rules of international human
rights law. This interpretation, however, is incorrect.
A proper interpretation of Article 293(1) requires recourse to Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).2 Article 31 is universal-
21. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 288(1). For the purposes of this Comment, an "UNCLOS
claim" is any claim "concerning the interpretation or application of [UNCLOS]." Id.
22. See id. pt. XV, § 3.
23. Id. art. 287. Technically, the ICJ is a "court" rather than a "tribunal," but this distinction is
immaterial here because the ICJ has never exercised jurisdiction by virtue of Article 288(1).
24. Id. annex VI, art. 2(1).
25. Id. annex VII, art. 3.
26. For a list of all ITLOS cases, including prompt release cases, see List of Cases, ITLOS, http://
www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases [http://perma.cc/L6VC-B3KR]. For a list of all Annex VII
cases administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, see UNCLOS, PERMANENT CT.
ARB., http://pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/unclos [http://perma.cc/QH2H
-9HZR]. The only Annex VII case not administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration
was Southern Bluefin Tuna, which was administered by the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes. Southern BluefinTuna (Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan), Award on Ju-
risdiction and Admissibility of Aug. 4, 2000, 23 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶¶ 8-9.
27. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 293(1) (emphasis added).
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ly considered to reflect customary international law,2 9 and scholars agree that
international courts and tribunals must apply the Article when interpreting
treaties.o Article 31 provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in ac-
cordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose."" In other words, one
must examine the items: the ordinary meaning of the text, the context, and the
object and purpose of the treaty.
First, the ordinary meaning of the text of Article 293(1) conveys the notion
that it does not expand the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals. In fact, the very
wording of the provision reveals that it only speaks to applicable law, not juris-
diction. Article 293(1) states: "A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this
section shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not in-
compatible with this Convention."32 It therefore envisages a two-step process:
first, the UNCLOS tribunal must determine whether it has jurisdiction (under
Article 288); second, if it has jurisdiction (and only if it has jurisdiction), then
the tribunal shall apply UNCLOS and "other rules of international law." Given
that Article 288(1) grants UNCLOS tribunals jurisdiction only over UNCLOS
claims," the "other rules of international law" should be interpreted as refer-
ring primarily to rules of international law that help UNCLOS tribunals exer-
cise their jurisdiction over UNCLOS claims.34
29. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803,
¶ 23 (Dec. 12); Jean-Marc Sorel & Valdrie Bor6 Eveno, Article 31 1969 Vienna Convention, in 1
THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 804, 818-819 (Olivier
Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011); Matthias Herdegen, Interpretation in International
Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. ¶ 7 (Mar. 2013), http://opil.ouplaw.com
/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e723 [http://perma.cc/48YG
-XYXG].
30. RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 40 (2010); TRINH HAI YEN, THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 107 (2014); Oliver D6rr, Article 32. Supplementary Means of
Interpretation, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 571, 582
(Oliver D6rr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012).
31. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 31.
32. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 293(1) (emphasis added).
33. Id. art. 288(1).
34. For example, in Philippines v. China, the Philippines asserted the claim that China had vio-
lated Articles 192 and 194 of UNCLOS (an UNCLOS claim). Phil. v. China, Award on Juris-
diction and Admissibility, supra note 15, ¶ 274. In light of Article 293(1), the tribunal held
that it could "consider the relevant provisions of the [Convention on Biological Diversity]
for the purposes of interpreting the content and standard of Articles 192 and 194 of [UN-
CLOS] ." Id. ¶ 176. As a general matter, the "other rules of international law" of Article
293(1) may include (1) rules contained within international agreements granting jurisdiction
to the tribunal under Article 288(2); (2) rules expressly referenced in renvoi provisions in
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Second, the context of Article 293(1) affirms this interpretation. The official
title of Article 288 is "Jurisdiction" and that of Article 293 is "Applicable Law,"
reinforcing the fact that the Convention considers them to be two separate no-
tions. One cannot use the applicable law provision (Article 293) to expand ju-
risdiction; otherwise, it would violate the jurisdiction provision (Article 288).
Third, the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as expressed in the Preamble, is
to govern "all issues relating to the law of the sea."" It is not intended to govern
issues outside the law of the sea. Consequently, it makes sense that Article
293(1) cannot expand the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals beyond their ju-
risdiction under Article 288(1) to resolve UNCLOS claims.
Therefore, Article 293(1) should not be interpreted as an expansion of the
jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals beyond UNCLOS.
II. CASES EXERCISING JURISDICTION
Despite this seemingly straightforward analysis, UNCLOS tribunals have
invoked Article 293(1) to expand their jurisdiction to non-UNCLOS claims in
three cases. The first was ITLOS's second case: M/V Saiga (No. 2). In 1997,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (St. Vincent) instituted an UNCLOS arbitra-
tion against Guinea claiming, inter alia, that Guinea had violated the prohibi-
tion on the use of excessive force in the detention of ships when Guinean au-
thorities arrested a ship registered in St. Vincent.3 6 Although the prohibition is
an established norm of customary international law," it is not explicitly en-
shrined in UNCLOS." The most pertinent provision concerning the use of
force in UNCLOS is Article 301, but this provision prohibits only the threat or
use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."" ITLOS therefore con-
UNCLOS; (3) secondary rules of general international law (e.g., treaty law, state responsi-
bility, and diplomatic protection); and (4) rules to help interpret UNCLOS under Article
31(3) (c) of the VCLT.
3s. UNCLOS, supra note 2, pmbl.
36. M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), ITLOS Case No. 2, Memorial of
St. Vincent of June 19, 1998, ¶ 95, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases
/case-no_2/merits/memorial-svg.pdf [http://perma.cc/AM74-AW7T].
37. See M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment, supra note 7, ¶ 156.
38. See id. ¶ 155; Tullio Scovazzi, ITLOS andJurisdiction over Ships, in JURISDICTION OVER SHIPS:
POST-UNCLOS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 382, 395 (Henrik Ringbom ed.,
2015).
39. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 301.
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cluded that UNCLOS does not expressly regulate the use of force in the arrest
of ships.40 As a result, St. Vincent's claim that Guinea violated the prohibition
on the use of excessive force in the detention of ships could not constitute a
claim under Article 301, but rather constituted a non-UNCLOS claim based on
customary international law. ITLOS, however, held:
Although the Convention does not contain express provisions on the
use of force in the arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by
virtue of article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must
be avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must
not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.
Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do
in other areas of international law.41
According to the language above, ITLOS only relied on Article 293(1) to
"apply" the prohibition on the use of excessive force, without making an ex-
press claim of jurisdiction. However, ITLOS ultimately made a formal deter-
mination that Guinea violated the prohibition,4 2 which ipso facto amounted to
an exercise of jurisdiction over the claim.4 3 Remarkably, ITLOS did not provide
any justification beyond the paragraph quoted above for this exercise of juris-
diction.
Then in 2004, in the case of Guyana v. Suriname, Guyana instituted pro-
ceedings against Suriname before an Annex VII tribunal claiming, inter alia,
that Suriname was "internationally responsible for violating ... the Charter of
the United Nations, and general international law ... because of its use of
armed force" against a Canadian vessel licensed by Guyana.44 Once again, alt-
hough UNCLOS prohibits the use of force against "the territorial integrity or
40. M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment, supra note 7, ¶ 155.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. ¶ 183(9).
43. A declaration by a judicial body that a state has violated a rule of international law is a para-
digmatic example of the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim. See, e.g., Questions Relating to
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 423, ¶¶ 49-52
(July 20); Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Maced. v. Greece),
Judgment, 2011 I.C.J. 644, ¶ 58 (Dec. 5); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 27-28 (Mar. 31); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment,
2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 31 (Nov. 6); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶ 42 (June
27).
44. Guyana v. Suriname, PCA Case Repository, Reply of Guyana of Apr. 1, 20o6, ¶ 10.1(3),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1o40 [http://perma.cc/NR9U-3JB7].
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political independence of any State,"4 5 the Convention does not prohibit the use
of force against foreign vessels. Consequently, Guyana's claim was a non-
UNCLOS claim arising under general international law. In deciding how to
deal with the non-UNCLOS claim, the tribunal simply cited M/V Saiga (No.
2) and held:
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS") [in M/V
Saiga (No. 2)] interpreted Article 293 as giving it competence to apply
not only the Convention, but also the norms of customary international
law (including, of course, those relating to the use of force) . . . . In the
view of this Tribunal this is a reasonable interpretation of Article 293
and therefore Suriname's contention that this Tribunal had "no jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate alleged violations of the United Nations Charter and
general international law" cannot be accepted.4 6
Notably, not only did the Annex VII tribunal explicitly state that Article 293
gave it "competence"4 7 (a synonym for "jurisdiction"48 ), but it also rejected Su-
riname's contention that it had no "jurisdiction"4 9 over the claim. Moreover,
without any further explanation, the tribunal expressly declared in the dispositif
of the award that it "ha[d] jurisdiction to consider and rule on Guyana's allega-
tion that Suriname has engaged in the unlawful use or threat of force contrary
to the Convention, the UN Charter, and general international law."so And like
ITLOS in M/V Saiga (No. 2), the Guyana v. Suriname tribunal ultimately made
a formal finding of a violation of the prohibition on the threat of the use of
force." There is thus no question that it exercised jurisdiction under Article
293(1)-
The most recent instance where an UNCLOS tribunal invoked Article
293(1) to expand its jurisdiction was the case of M/V Virginia G, where ITLOS
45. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 301.
46. Guyana v. Suriname, Award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 405-o6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
47. Id. ¶ 405.
48. CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 6o (2003);
see also JUAN JOSE QUINTANA, LITIGATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE 3 n.1 (2015) (describing any distinction between jurisdiction and com-
petence as "of little importance in practice"); 1 HUGH THIRLWAY, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: FIFTY YEARS OF JURISPRUDENCE 691-92 (2013)
(critiquing proposed distinctions between jurisdiction and competence).
49. Guyana v. Suriname, Award, supra note 8, ¶ 4o6.
so. Id. ¶ 4 87(ii) (emphasis added).
s. Id. ¶ 488(2).
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faced a situation very similar to that in M/V Saiga (No. 2). In 2011, Panama in-
stituted an UNCLOS arbitration against Guinea-Bissau for arresting an oil
tanker registered in Panama. Like St. Vincent in M/V Saiga (No. 2), Panama
claimed, inter alia, that Guinea-Bissau had violated the prohibition on the use
of excessive force in detaining the vessel.52 Although Panama asserted that this
prohibition arose under both "the Convention and . . . international law,""
UNCLOS, again, does not contain any provisions on the prohibition on the use
of excessive force against a vessel.54 Therefore, Panama's claim, like St. Vin-
cent's claim, was a non-UNCLOS claim. In deciding whether it could exercise
jurisdiction over this claim, ITLOS, like the Guyana v. Suriname tribunal, simp-
ly quoted the discussion on Article 293(1) in M/V Saiga (No. 2),s and exer-
cised jurisdiction over the claim by making a finding that there was no viola-
tion of the prohibition.56
In conclusion, even though Article 293(1) should not be invoked to expand
the jurisdiction of an UNCLOS tribunal, the M/V Saiga (No. 2), Guyana v. Su-
riname, and M/V Virginia G tribunals all effectively exercised jurisdiction under
the provision-implicitly in M/V Saiga (No. 2) and M/V Virginia G, and ex-
plicitly in Guyana v. Suriname.
III. CASES REJECTING JURISDICTION
Aside from the M/V Saiga (No. 2) line of cases, only four other UNCLOS
tribunals - all Annex VII tribunals - have considered the question of whether
Article 293(1) may expand their jurisdiction. In all four cases, the Annex VII
tribunals correctly held that Article 293(1) could not enlarge their jurisdiction.
But they did not go so far as to state that the M/V Saiga (No. 2) line of cases
was incorrectly decided.
The first such case was MOXPlant. In 2001, Ireland brought an UNCLOS
arbitration against the United Kingdom, claiming, inter alia, that the United
Kingdom violated two norms of international environmental law with respect
to a mixed oxide plant across the Irish Sea from Ireland.7 As the environmen-
52. M/V Virginia G, Judgment, supra note 9, ¶ 54(1) (10).
53 Id.
54. See sources cited supra note 38.
55. M/V Virginia G, Judgment, supra note 9, ¶ 359 (quoting M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment, su-
pra note 7, ¶¶ 155-56). For quoted text, see supra text accompanying note 41.
56. M/V Virginia G, Judgment, supra note 9, ¶ 362.
57. MOX Plant (Ir. v. UK) (UNCLOS), PCA Case Repository, Memorial of Ireland of
July 26, 2002, pt. I, ¶ 1.2, http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/849 [http://perma.cc
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tal norms in question are not enshrined in UNCLOS, the claims were un-
doubtedly non-UNCLOS claims. Yet Ireland cited M/V Saiga (No. 2) to argue
that the tribunal had the authority to find a violation of the norms in ques-
tion." Although the Annex VII tribunal never issued a final award," it famous-
ly stated in Procedural Order No. 3 that "there is a cardinal distinction between
the scope of its jurisdiction under article 288, paragraph 1, of the Convention,
on the one hand, and the law to be applied by the Tribunal under article 293 of
the Convention, on the other hand."60 And in a formal statement released by its
president, the tribunal asserted that any non-UNCLOS claims would be inad-
missible.6 1 In doing so, it did not attempt to reconcile the inconsistency be-
tween its holding and ITLOS's judgment in M/VSaiga (No. 2).
Then in 2010, in the case of Chagos, Mauritius brought an UNCLOS pro-
ceeding against the United Kingdom over the Chagos Marine Protected Area,
requesting, inter alia, that the tribunal determine who -Mauritius or the Unit-
ed Kingdom-had sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago.6 2 As UNCLOS
does not contain provisions on territorial sovereignty,63 Mauritius's claim was a
non-UNCLOS claim. Yet Mauritius cited M/V Saiga (No. 2) and Guyana v. Su-
riname for the proposition that the tribunal could apply non-UNCLOS rules of
international law to resolve the sovereignty claim as long as it was sufficiently
connected with an UNCLOS claim. 64 The Annex VII tribunal first clarified that
"[w]hether the Tribunal ... may apply such exterior sources of law and ad-
/AXG 7-8E97 ] (describing the plant); MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) (UNCLOS), PCA Case Re-
pository, Memorial of Ireland of July 26, 2002, pt. II, ¶ 6.21, http://www.pcacases.com
/web/sendAttach/85o [http://perma.cc/73J4-7FMS] (describing the legal violations).
58. MoxPlant, PCA Case Repository, Memorial of Ireland of July 26, 2002, pt. II, ¶ 6.21 & n.36.
59. Ireland ultimately withdrew its claim for unrelated reasons. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.)
(UNCLOS), PCA Case Repository, Press Release of June 6, 2008, http://www.pcacases.com
/web/sendAttach/876 [http://perma.cc/YVW8-Z3CE].
6o. MOXPlant, Procedural Order No. 3, supra note lo, ¶ 19.
61. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) (UNCLOS), PCA Case Repository, Statement by the President of
June 13, 2003, ¶ 5, http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/877 [http://perma.cc/GX72
-42KJ]. Notably, in Procedural Order No. 3, the tribunal stated that any non-UNCLOS
claims "may be" inadmissible. MOXPlant, Procedural Order No. 3, supra note lo, ¶ 19.
62. Mauritius characterized the request as a determination over the identity of the "coastal
State." Chagos Marine Protected Area, Memorial of Mauritius, supra note 5, at 155. However,
the tribunal ultimately determined that the request "is properly characterized as relating to
land sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago." Chagos Marine Protected Area, Award, supra
note 1, ¶ 212.
63 See sources cited infra note 104.
64. Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA Case Repository No. 2011-3, Hear-
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dress such matters raises a question of the scope of jurisdiction under the Con-
vention."6 s It then found that it did not have jurisdiction over the sovereignty
claim.66 Notably, although it summarized the parties' arguments on Article
293(1), M/V Saiga (No. 2), and Guyana v. Suriname,6 7 the tribunal did not refer
to any of them when explaining its decision.6 8
The third case that rejected an expansion of jurisdiction under Article
293(1) was Arctic Sunrise. In 2013, the Netherlands instituted UNCLOS pro-
ceedings against Russia, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that Russia had violat-
ed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in its ar-
rest and detention of the Greenpeace activists aboard the MV Arctic Sunrise.6 9
Since the ICCPR is a separate treaty not codified in UNCLOS, the Annex VII
tribunal was confronted with a non-UNCLOS claim. In line with the jurispru-
dence of the MOX Plant and Chagos tribunals, the Arctic Sunrise tribunal ex-
pressly held that "Article 293(1) does not extend the jurisdiction of the tribu-
nal"o and "Article 293 is not ... a means to obtain a determination that some
treaty other than the Convention has been violated."" In applying this princi-
ple to the case before it, the tribunal declared: "This Tribunal does not consider
that it has jurisdiction to apply directly provisions such as Articles 9 and 12(2)
of the ICCPR or to determine breaches of such provisions."72
Unlike the MOX Plant and Chagos tribunals, the Arctic Sunrise tribunal at-
tempted to distinguish M/V Saiga (No. 2). Despite its general statement on Ar-
ticle 293(1), the tribunal held:
In the case of some broadly worded or general provisions, it may also be
necessary to rely on primary rules of international law other than the
65. Chagos Marine Protected Area, Award, supra note 1, ¶ 203.
66. Id. ¶ 221.
67. Id. ¶¶ 180-86.
68. Id. ¶¶ 203-21.
69. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), PCA Case Repository No. 2014-02, Notification and
Statement of the Claim of the Netherlands of Oct. 4, 2013, ¶ 37(1)(c), http://
www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1314 [http://perma.cc/3VY4-EQH4]; Arctic Sunrise
(Neth. v. Russ.), PCA Case Repository No. 2014-02, Memorial of the Netherlands of Aug.
31, 2014, ¶ 175, http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/14o6 [http://perma.cc/PN89
-LP2Q]; Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), PCA Case Repository No. 2014-02, Second
Supplemental Written Pleadings of the Netherlands of Jan. 12, 2015, at 6-7, http://
www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1411 [http://perma.cc/P5XW-CLHR].
70. Arctic Sunrise, Award on the Merits, supra note 12, ¶ 188.
71. Id. ¶ 192.
72. Id. ¶ 198.
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Convention in order to interpret and apply particular provisions of the
Convention. Both arbitral tribunals and ITLOS have interpreted the
Convention as allowing for the application of relevant rules of interna-
tional law. Article 293 of the Convention makes this possible. For in-
stance, in M/V "SAIGA" No. 2, ITLOS took account of general interna-
tional law rules on the use of force in considering the use of force for
the arrest of a vessel.7 3
This attempt to accommodate M/V Saiga (No. 2) is not convincing for two
reasons. First, the tribunal failed to specify exactly which "broadly worded or
general provision[]" was at play in M/V Saiga (No. 2). The reality is that IT-
LOS had not specified any such substantive provision when explaining its exer-
cise of jurisdiction over the use-of-force claim.74 Second, the tribunal down-
played ITLOS's treatment of the use-of-force claim in M/V Saiga (No. 2). As
discussed above, ITLOS had declared a violation of the prohibition on the use
of excessive force, which amounted to an exercise of jurisdiction. The Arctic
Sunrise tribunal, however, stated that ITLOS merely "took account" of rules
concerning the use of force.
The fourth and final case that rejected an expansion of jurisdiction under
Article 293(1) was Duzgit Integrity. In 2013, just a few weeks after the Nether-
lands filed its claim against Russia, Malta instituted UNCLOS proceedings
against So Tom6 and Principe (Sao Tom6) over So Tom's arrest of the Mal-
tese vessel Duzgit Integrity in Sio Tomdan archipelagic waters. Malta argued,
inter alia, that So Tom6's arrest, imprisonment, and fining of the master and
crew of the vessel violated "generally applicable rules of international law relat-
ed to fundamental human rights and humanitarian concerns."76 As UNCLOS
does not contain provisions on "human rights and humanitarian concerns," Sao
Tom6 argued that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over these non-
UNCLOS claims.77 After considering both Article 288(1) and Article 293(1),
the tribunal concluded that "[ti he combined effect of these two provisions is
that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine breaches of obliga-
tions not having their source in the Convention (including human rights obli-
73. Id. ¶ 191-
74. M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment, supra note 7, ¶¶ 153-59.
75. See Duzgit Integrity, Award, supra note 13, ¶ 7; Arctic Sunrise, Award on the Merits, supra note
12, ¶ 21.
76. Duzgit Integrity, Award, supra note 13, ¶ 121(9); see id. ¶ 203.
77. Id. ¶ 204.
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gations)."" As a result, the tribunal held that it was "not competent to deter-
mine if fundamental human rights obligations were violated by Sio Tom6.""
Notably, the Duzgit Integrity tribunal attempted to reconcile this holding
with M/V Saiga (No. 2) in two ways. First, it invoked the same argument as
the Arctic Sunrise tribunal concerning "broadly worded or general provisions,"
but, like the Arctic Sunrise tribunal, it failed to specify the provision in question
in M/V Saiga (No. 2) and downplayed ITLOS's treatment of the use-of-force
claim in that case.so Second, again citing M/V Saiga (No. 2)," it held:
The exercise of enforcement powers by a (coastal) State in situations
where the State derives these powers from provisions of the Convention
is also governed by certain rules and principles of general international
law, in particular the principle of reasonableness. This principle encom-
passes the principles of necessity and proportionality. These principles
do not only apply in cases where States resort to force, but to all
measures of law enforcement. Article 293(1) requires the application of
these principles.82
This justification, however, fails to recognize that the M/V Saiga (No. 2) tribu-
nal, like the Guyana v. Suriname and M/V Virginia G tribunals, had made a
formal finding in the dispositif of a violation of international law without refer-
ence to a particular provision of UNCLOS." By contrast, when the Duzgit In-
tegrity tribunal applied the principle of reasonableness to Sio Tom6's conduct,
its sole conclusion was that Sio Tom6 had violated Article 49(3) of UNCLOS.84
Consequently, the Duzgit Integrity tribunal did not fully justify ITLOS's exercise
of jurisdiction over the use-of-force claim in M/V Saiga (No. 2).
The MOX Plant line of cases reveals an interesting phenomenon: although
each Annex VII tribunal expressly or impliedly acknowledged that Article
293(1) does not expand the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals, none of them
stated that the M/V Saiga (No. 2) line of cases was wrongly decided. The MOX
Plant and Chagos tribunals avoided addressing the cases entirely, and the Arctic
Sunrise and Duzgit Integrity tribunals attempted to fit M/V Saiga (No. 2) into
78. Id. ¶ 207.
79. Id. ¶ 210.
80. Id. ¶ 208 & n.384.
81. Id. ¶ 209 n-385.
82. Id. ¶ 209.
83. Guyana v. Suriname, Award, supra note 8, ¶ 488(2); M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment, supra
note 7, ¶ 183(9); M/V Virginia G, Judgment, supra note 9, ¶ 452(13).
84. Duzgit Integrity, Award, supra note 13, ¶¶ 261-62, 342(c).
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an exception to the general principle. How can one explain this behavior? Four
possible reasons are considered below.
First, as a legal matter, the tribunals in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) line of cases
may have actually been correct in exercising jurisdiction over their respective
claims, even if Article 293(1) was an incorrect basis for that jurisdiction. In-
stead, the tribunals could have plausibly invoked Article 288(1) as the source of
jurisdiction, characterizing the claims as UNCLO S claims under Articles 56(2),
58(l), 58(3), 87(1), and/or 301."
Second, as a policy matter, the tribunals in the MOXPlant line of cases may
have considered the M/V Saiga (No. 2) line of decisions to be good public poli-
cy. One cannot overlook the fact that the non-UNCLOS claims in M/V Saiga
(No. 2), Guyana v. Suriname, and M/V Virginia G were all related to the prohi-
bition on the use of force in international law. The fact that the prohibition is a
"cornerstone" of the U.N. Charter8 6 and widely considered a jus cogens norm87
may have discouraged the MOX Plant, Chagos, Arctic Sunrise, and Duzgit Integ-
rity tribunals from criticizing the M/VSaiga (No. 2) line of decisions.
Third, as a political matter, the tribunals in the MOX Plant line of cases
may have found it inappropriate to criticize the M/V Saiga (No. 2) and M/V
Virginia G tribunals because of the composition of the tribunals themselves.
The MOX Plant, Chagos, Arctic Sunrise, and Duzgit Integrity tribunals were all
85. In M/V Saiga (No. 2), St. Vincent could have based the tribunal's jurisdiction on Article
58(1), which contains a reference to Article 87(1), which provides that "[f]reedom of the
high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by . .. other rules of international aw."
UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 87(1) (emphasis added). In Guyana v. Suriname, Guyana could
have based the tribunal's jurisdiction on Articles 56(2) and 58(3), which contain references
to "the rights and duties of other States" and "the rights and duties of the coastal State." Id.
arts. 56(2), 58(3). And in M/V Virginia G, Panama could have based the tribunal's jurisdic-
tion on Article 56 (2). Alternatively, in all three cases, the applicants could also have attempt-
ed to bring the use-of-force claim under Article 301, claiming that the use of force in ques-
tion was "inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations." Id. art. 301.
86. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J.
168, ¶ 148 (Dec. 19) ("The prohibition against the use of force is a cornerstone of the United
Nations Charter."); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 290, ¶ 1.1 (Nov.
6) (Elaraby, J., dissenting) ("The principle of the prohibition of the use of force in interna-
tional relations . . . is, no doubt, the most important principle in contemporary international
law to govern inter-State conduct; it is indeed the cornerstone of the Charter.").
87. See Oliver D6rr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L
L. ¶ 1 (June 2011), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/lo.-o93/law:epil/978o19923169o/law
-9780199231690-e427?prd=EPIL [http://perma.cc/Z4AT-3WG9]; e.g., Oil Platforms, 2003
I.C.J. at 290, ¶ 1.1 (Elaraby, J., dissenting) ("The principle of the prohibition of the use of
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Annex VII tribunals composed of three or five ad hoc arbitrators," whereas
ITLOS, which decided M/V Saiga (No. 2) and M/V Virginia G, is a permanent
judicial body composed of twenty-one judges elected for their expertise in the
law of the sea." The Annex VII tribunals therefore may have found it inappro-
priate to accuse ITLOS of having committed a legal error in light of the author-
ity it commands by virtue of its permanence, size, and expertise.
Fourth, on an individual level, ITLOS judges and UNCLOS arbitrators
come from the same circle of elite lawyers. As a result, the members of the tri-
bunals in the MOX Plant line of cases may not have wanted to accuse their
friends, colleagues, or even prior selves of having been wrong. Indeed, the
President of the MOX Plant and Arctic Sunrise tribunals (Thomas A. Mensah)o
was the President of ITLOS in M/V Saiga (No. 2)." As for the Chagos tribunal,
the President (Ivan Shearer)92 was a member of the Guyana v. Suriname tribu-
nal," and three other members of the Chagos tribunal (Riidiger Wolfrum, Al-
bert Hoffman, and James Kateka)94 were, respectively, the Vice-President of
ITLOS in M/V Saiga (No. 2)," the Vice-President of ITLOS in M/V Virginia
G,96 and a judge of ITLOS in M/V Virginia G." Finally, with respect to the
Duzgit Integrity tribunal, one member (Tullio Treves)98 was a judge of ITLOS
in M/V Saiga (No. 2)99 and M/V Virginia G,00 and another member (James
Kateka)o1 was a judge of ITLOS in M/V Virginia G.102
88. Annex VII tribunals are normally composed of five arbitrators. UNCLOS, supra note 2, an-
nex VII, art. 3. However, in Duzgit Integrity, Malta and Slio Tom6 agreed to have a tribunal
composed of three arbitrators. Duzgit Integrity, Award, supra note 13, ¶ 9.
89. UNCLOS, supra note 2, annex VI, art. 2(1).
go. Arctic Sunrise, Award on the Merits, supra note 12, at i; MOXPIant, Procedural Order No. 3,
supra note lo, at 1.
91. M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment, supra note 7, at 3.
92. Chagos Marine Protected Area, Award, supra note 1, ¶ 17.
93. Guyana v. Suriname, Award, supra note 8, at 166.
94. Chagos Marine Protected Area, Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 15, 17. Note that Riidiger Wolfrum
and James Kateka jointly wrote a dissenting and concurring opinion in Chagos that advocat-
ed a more expansive view of the tribunal's jurisdiction. See Chagos Marine Protected
Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA Case Repository No. 2011-03, Dissenting & Concurring
Opinion of Mar. 18, 2015, ¶¶ 29-45, http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1570
[http://perma.cc/Q7AE-ZT941.
95. M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment, supra note 7, at 3.
96. M/V Virginia G, Judgment, supra note 9, at 3.
97. Id.
98. Duzgit Integrity, Award, supra note 13, at i.
99. M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment, supra note 7, at 3.
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One can therefore understand why the tribunals in the MOX Plant line of
cases did not expressly state that the tribunals in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) line of
cases had committed a legal error. These legal, policy, political, and individual
pressures perhaps discouraged the MOX Plant, Chagos, Arctic Sunrise, and Duz-
git Integrity tribunals from critiquing the M/V Saiga (No. 2), Guyana v. Suri-
name, and M/V Virginia G tribunals.
CONCLUSION
Although understandable, the failure of the tribunals in the MOX Plant line
of cases to expressly recognize the legal error of the M/V Saiga (No. 2) line of
cases may ultimately undermine the UNCLOS dispute settlement regime.
Since the UNCLOS tribunals in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) line of cases exercised
jurisdiction under Article 293(1) without significant reproach, UNCLOS tribu-
nals may continue to be tempted to follow their path. Indeed, despite wide
modern acceptance of the principle that applicable law provisions do not ex-
pand the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, ITLOS in the recent
M/V Virginia G case still felt compelled to follow the precedent it set in M/V
Saiga (No. 2). And there is no guarantee that future tribunals will not extend
their jurisdiction even further, beyond what ITLOS would have accepted in
M/V Saiga (No. 2). The Annex VII tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname, for exam-
ple, appeared to take on a very expansive notion of its jurisdiction, ultimately
holding that it had jurisdiction not only over claims concerning the use of
force, but also over violations of the U.N. Charter, customary international law,
and general international law.
Such a notion of jurisdiction would have significant consequences for
Ukraine v. Russia. On September 14, 2016, Ukraine instituted arbitration pro-
ceedings against Russia under UNCLOS, claiming, inter alia, that Russia has
interfered with "its rights as the coastal state in maritime zones adjacent to
Crimea in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait."os The validity of this
claim, however, depends on a Ukrainian claim of sovereignty over Crimea. As
i00. Tullio Treves was a judge ad hoc in this case. M/V Virginia G, Judgment, supra note 9, at 3.
101. Duzgit Integrity, Award, supra note 13, at i.
102. M/V Virginia G, Judgment, supra note 9, at 3.
103. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the Initiation of Arbitration
Against the Russian Federation Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
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territorial sovereignty disputes fall outside the scope of UNCLOS,104 the tribu-
nal may have to determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction over this non-
UNCLOS sovereignty claim. Under the jurisprudence of Guyana v. Suriname,
the tribunal could arguably invoke Article 293(1) to exercise such jurisdiction.
But there are real doubts as to whether UNCLOS tribunals should have the ju-
risdiction to settle such prominent territorial sovereignty disputes.os
Any unwarranted expansion of jurisdiction is dangerous. It must be re-
membered that the international legal order depends on the consent of states.
The reason UNCLOS tribunals are authorized to exercise jurisdiction over dis-
putes in the first place is that the disputing states ratified or acceded to the
Convention. If UNCLOS tribunals begin exercising jurisdiction over disputes
for which states never intended to grant them jurisdiction, the legitimacy of
UNCLOS dispute settlement may be questioned. Not only may more states fol-
low in the steps of China and Russia in not participating in UNCLOS proceed-
ings,1 but the relatively few states who have not yet ratified or acceded to the
Convention- such as the United States - may be less inclined to do so.
As a result, it is the responsibility of UNCLOS tribunals to exercise only the
jurisdiction accorded to them. As the M/V Saiga (No. 2), Guyana v. Suriname,
104. See Irina Buga, Territorial Sovereignty Issues in Maritime Disputes: AJurisdictional Dilemma for
Law of the Sea Tribunals, 27 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 59, 68 (2012) ("'[P]ure' territorial
disputes do not fall within the jurisdiction of [Law of the Sea] tribunals."); Paul C. Irwin,
Settlement of Maritime Boundary Disputes: An Analysis of the Law of the Sea Negotiations, 8
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 105, 114 (1980) ("Indeed it would be beyond the substantive scope
of the Convention to determine the status of land territory. As substantive articles of the
Convention do not relate to such matters, it would certainly be inappropriate for the dispute
settlement provisions to cover them."); Bernard H. Oxman, Courts and Tribunals: The ICJ,
ITLOS, and Arbitral Tribunals, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 394, 400
(Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015) (noting that "land sovereignty questions are not ad-
dressed by [UNCLOS]"); Robert W. Smith & Bradford Thomas, Island Disputes and the Law
of the Sea: An Examination of Sovereignty and Delimitation Disputes, in SECURITY FLASH-
POINTS: OIL, ISLANDS, SEA ACCESS AND MILITARY CONFRONTATION 55, 66 (Myron H.
Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 1998) (" [UNCLOS] does not contain any provisions
in any of its articles that discuss the resolution of disputes over any territory . . . .") (empha-
sis omitted)); Sienho Yee, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. China): Po-
tential Jurisdictional Obstacles or Objections, 13 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 663, 688-89 (2014) ("It is
elemental that the law of the sea does not address sovereignty over continental or insular
land territory.").
105. See Chagos Marine Protected Area, Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 219-21.
106. China did not participate in the Philippines v. China arbitration, and Russia is not
participating in the Arctic Sunrise arbitration. See Phil. v. China, PCA Case Repository
No. 2013-19, Award of July 12, 2016, at i, http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%2o
-%2o2o160712%2o-%2oAward.pdf [http://perma.cc/92VJ-YX62]; Arctic Sunrise, Award on
the Merits, supra note 12, at iii.
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and M/V Virginia G tribunals have made a legal error by relying on Article
293(1) to establish their jurisdiction over use-of-force claims, UNCLOS tribu-
nals should not be afraid to say so. Avoiding the discussion or attempting to
distinguish that line of cases is insufficient. Rather, an express-though, of
course, diplomatic- refutation of that jurisprudence is necessary to preserve
the legitimacy of UNCLOS proceedings. Otherwise, states may continue to in-
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